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Introduction: A Summary of International Laws of War

Our History with Atrocity Crimes
Article 1 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Cherokee Nation,
signed July 22nd, 1779, one of the first treaties the US signed, reads:
That all offenses or acts of hostility by one or either of the contracting parties against the
other be mutually forgiven and buried in the depths of oblivion, nevermore to be had in
remembrance.1
Even before the Articles of Confederation unified the American colonies in March, 1781, the
foundation of the relationship between the United States and international law had been laid.
This foundation relied, as the above quotation suggests, in the practice of forgiving and
forgetting atrocity crimes. The very beginning of American foreign policy dictated that our
nation bury our responsibility for atrocity crimes “in the depths of oblivion.” America’s history
with international law and international crime has been peppered by instances of war crimes and
crimes against peace that are rarely prosecuted because of the United States’ immense power.

1

Continental Congress, Article 1, Treaty between the United States of America and the Cherokee Nation,
quoted in David Scheffer, “War Crimes and the Clinton Administration”, International Justice, War Crimes,
and Terrorism: US Record (Vol. 69, No. 4, 2002), 1109.
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Our nation’s relationship with international criminal law, however, has also been one of
support and leadership. During the Nuremberg Tribunals,
the State Department effectively merged war crimes and human rights by viewing them
through a politically universalist, state-centered prism that made the prevention of cruelty
a policy priority,
write Liliana Riga and James Kennedy in their study of the emergence of the human rights
movement.2 America’s leadership during Nuremberg altered the narrative about state-sanctioned
violence, transforming international legal theory from one respecting sovereignty above all into a
system that made human life a priority.
The duality of the United States’ relationship with international criminal law and human
rights atrocities is a fascinating theme that weaves through all of American history, but most
distinctly demonstrates the contradictory nature of American foreign policy in the latter half of
the 20th century. America is both protector of human rights and perpetrator of human rights
atrocities, global police force and aggressor. The Cold War exacerbated the tensions caused by
American military dominance. The international political and physical power of the American
military allowed the United States to do as it pleased in the 20th century with few consequences,
but that power also brought watchfulness from the global community and an expectation that the
United States would intervene when rogue states or leaders committed crimes against humanity.
The international legal community has expected the United States to act and illegally intervene in
some situations, but to pursue policy changes peacefully through diplomatic channels on other
occasions.

2

Liliana Riga and James Kennedy, “Putting Cruelty First: Interpreting War Crimes as Human Rights
Atrocities in US Policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” British Sociological Association Journal (Vol. 46, No.
5, 2012), 862.
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For example, when Slobodan Milosevic terrorized the Balkan states with his violent
brand of Serbian nationalism in the 1990s, human rights monitors, refugees, and American
citizens pleaded with Western forces to prevent Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign from
becoming a genocide.3 When NATO illegally entered the conflict by bombing Yugoslav military
targets, scholars and onlookers praised the Clinton Administration for bringing a war criminal to
justice while also arguing that the United States had committed crimes against peace, and
breached its treaty obligations.4 This duality does not reflect two mutually exclusive arguments,
but rather, two conflicting, but valid, truths; the US occupies a unique place in the international
order in which it both influences the creation of law designed to protect civilians and peace, but
also violates that law to serve its own interests and ideology. The core argument of this thesis lies
in analyses of three armed conflicts in Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Kosovo. The United States
violated the laws of war, and because of American military and political predominance, never
faced serious consequences. As this thesis will demonstrate, the international community’s
inability to prosecute or properly punish the United States for grave breaches of the laws of war
has had an immense impact on the development of human rights law.
The Post-Nuremberg Laws of War and American Adherence
The Nuremberg Tribunals represent a momentous turning point in international legal
history; accordingly, one must understand Nuremberg as the foundation of modern international
law before delving into the subject of American breaches of that law. The trials of members of
the Nazi Party and perpetrators of the Shoah served not only as a reckoning for the decimation of

3

Steven Livingston, “Media Coverage of the War: an Empirical Assessment,” in eds. Albrecht Schnabel
and Ramesh Thakur, Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention, United Nations University
Press (Tokyo, 2000), 377.
4
For more information, please see Chapter Two on Kosovo.
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Europe’s Jews, Poles, homosexuals, and other minority groups, but also as an assessment of the
crime of war. International law following Nuremberg “witnessed a change in thinking about the
rights, obligations, and duties” of the nation-state as an international actor.5
The Crime of Aggression
The Nuremberg Tribunal’s Chief Justice Robert Jackson saw the crime of aggression as
the Nazi’s ultimate crime against humanity.6 After Nuremberg, when drafting the Geneva
Conventions and the Charter of the United Nations, the United States and other Allied nations
codified the crime of war.7 These documents, signed and ratified by the United States, outlined
that states could only engage in violence against another state in self-defense, and even then,
only if the United Nations Security Council had determined that that was the only course of
action.8 The UN Charter holds state sovereignty as an extremely important principle, declaring
that states cannot intervene in one another’s internal affairs. When there is “an internal struggle
for control of a national society,” the UN Charter rules that “the outcome… [should be] virtually
independent of external participation,” and “it is inappropriate for a foreign nation to use military
power to influence the outcome,” as renowned international legal scholar Richard A. Falk
summarizes.9 Post-Nuremberg, wars of aggression were no longer permissible. Nonetheless, this
practice did not stop states from engaging in violent intervention, but rather, caused states to
depict their wars and military conflicts differently.10 Nations no longer state that their wars are

5

Henry T. King and Theodore C. Theofrastous, “From Nuremberg to Rome: A Step Backward for US
Foreign Policy,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, (Vol. 31, No. 1, 1999), 50.
6
Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, Alfred A. Knopf Publishing (New York, 1992), 45.
7
Chapters 1, 2, and 3 have much more detailed discussions of the text of these documents.
8
See above.
9
Richard A. Falk, “International Law,” in ed. John Ratte, From Nuremberg to My Lai, Amherst College
Press (Amherst, 1979), 174.
10
Linda S. Bishai, “Leaving Nuremberg: America’s Love/Hate Relationship with International Law,”
Review of International Studies, (Vol. 34, No. 3, 2008), 438-442.
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just. Instead, states encourage a narrative of self-defense, of preemptive self-defense, or as
peace-keeping missions when, in fact, the military action is taken to protect that nation’s interests
abroad.11 This shift in international legal practice has complicated international governmental
and legal bodies’ ability to apply the laws of war to modern conflicts.
Defining War Crimes via the Geneva Conventions
In 1950, Justice Robert Jackson wrote in a Supreme Court decision that
modern American law has come a long way since the outbreak of war made every enemy
national an outlaw, subject to both private and public slaughter, cruelty, and plunder.12
Jackson was, of course, an idealist. Though American law dictated that civilians would be treated
with respect and dignity, the pages of this thesis are filled with instances of enemy nationals
indeed being treated as outlaws and combatants in the name of military necessity. Nonetheless,
the laws to which Jackson’s opinion alludes is clear and decisive about how states must treat all
civilians in times of war.
The Geneva Conventions, as they are collectively called, consist of the First Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, the Second Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, the Third Geneva Convention relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and finally, the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The United States signed these four treaties in
1949, and ratified them soon after, adopting the majority of the terms in the US Army Field
Manuals for Land and Sea Warfare.13 This means that all American servicemen and women, all

11

Ibid.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), 768-769.
13
This issue will be discussed more fully in Chapter 2.
12
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American citizens, and all American leaders are obligated to follow the terms of the Geneva
Conventions as the laws of war.
The Fourth Geneva Convention obligates states to respect all foreign civilians, regardless
of the state of the armed conflict in which the state is involved. States have an obligation to
protect civilians and ensure that their militaries are actively protecting civilians.14 States are also
prevented from committing what are called “grave breaches” of the laws of war. Grave breaches
consist of the most heinous crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, kidnapping, forced
deportation, and torture; committing any one of these acts constitutes a war crime.15
Additionally, state signatories are required by the Fourth Geneva Convention to find and try
perpetrators of such atrocities, regardless of the perpetrator’s nationality.16 Unfortunately, as the
following chapters will demonstrate, the United States has broken each of these sacred
obligations.
Upon the creation of the International Criminal Court, Marc Thiessen, a spokesman for
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, bluntly explained his committee’s refusal to support
the ICC by simply saying “we are not willing to put the United States up to the justice of the
world.”17 Thiessen’s honest remark reflects much about America’s role in the global community.
First, the United States’ ability to simply decline to follow its treaty obligations without fearing
real consequences is unique and has influenced a good portion of 20th century foreign policy.
Second, Thiessen’s statement implies that the US has done wrong, and that there is justice to be

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Article 2, Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS
287, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36d2.html.
15
Ibid., Article 147.
16
Ibid., Articles 145-146.
17
Marc Thiessen, quoted in King and Theofrastous,82.
14
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faced, and crimes to be uncovered. Finally, the statement suggests that Thiessen believes that the
global legal community would deem some actions criminal that Thiessen either thinks are
justifiable or not criminal in the first place. As the final portions of this thesis will discuss,
America’s military activities in the 20th century have had a significant impact on the
International Criminal Court.
Methods, Sources, and Structure
The body of this thesis consists of three case studies in order to demonstrate the depth
and impact of American war crimes in the late 20th century. The first chapter analyzes the US
military’s response to war crimes committed in Vietnam, and the judicial structure of the US
military in order to explain why American soldiers were never prosecuted in domestic or military
courts for their war crimes. It does this by first describing the nature of American crimes and the
culture of violence within deployed troops, discussing the political pressures that made true
prosecution unlikely, and finally by detailing the impact these unpunished crimes had on the
international legal order. Then, the second chapter will demonstrate the manners in which the
CIA and the Reagan Administration violated the laws of war by supporting the violent
Anti-Sandinista paramilitary groups that terrorized Nicaragua after the Sandinista Revolution in
1979. Both of these chapters rely heavily on eyewitness testimony of both American citizens and
soldiers and the victims and perpetrators of atrocity crimes, and compare the stories told to the
international law we see broken in the testimony. Finally, the third chapter analyzes the human
rights laws NATO broke in its involvement in the Kosovo conflict. This chapter differs from the
first two significantly, as it is a demonstration of America’s role as a global protector during the

7

Clinton Administration. The thesis will conclude by discussing the ways in which these three
conflicts have impacted the development of international criminal law after 1999.
A theme that returns again and again in the study of American war crimes is the power of
individuals; this is what separates a historical analysis of the progression of international law
from a theoretical approach based on international relations. American foreign policy is not a
predestined or even planned trajectory created by anti-humanitarian politicians. The identities,
political affiliations, personal histories, and temporal locations of individual decision makers all
influence American military activity and the consequences imposed when an atrocity takes place.
One cannot view American military and legal history as a static, overdetermined timeline.
Rather, these histories were processes shaped by political, cultural, and economic pressures
specific to the circumstances in which they took place.

8

Chapter One: Atrocities in Vietnam and American Military Justice
Introduction:
The Vietnam War represents one of the darkest periods in American history, and
certainly within the Cold War. The conflicted ended what was called “the consensus era” in the
United States, a period of little mainstream partisan disagreement, and exposed stark divisions
within American society over the place of the United States in the global community and the role
morality ought to play in warfare and interventionism.18 The signing of the Geneva Conventions,
as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, marked a new era in global cooperation and the
prevention of genocide and crimes against humanity for the future; however, American actions in
Indochina challenged these hopes. This chapter will focus on the United States’ failure to fulfill
its obligation to prosecute its military’s war crimes and the consequences not prosecuting
perpetrators of war crimes has had on international criminal law.
18

The period immediately after the Second World War was an era of both domestic peace and Cold War
anxiety. The consensus era refers to the relatively calm state of sociopolitical affairs between 1950 and
~1968, during which period the American economy drastically improved quality of life. The consensus era
perhaps appears as calm and bipartisan as it does because of the contentious era that followed it.

9

The United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War opened a new narrative about the
rules of warfare in the international community and the application of the precedent of
international law created during and immediately after the Nuremberg Judgement. The American
military’s actions in Vietnam and the lack of international action against leaders in the United
States contrasted the precedent set at Nuremberg and directly violated the laws of war codified
by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The war crimes committed by the United States’ military were
not isolated events separate from the conflict as a whole, but rather, were representative of the
atmosphere and culture of violence that characterized the Vietnam War. This chapter will survey
the modern discussions of international law through the lens of the Vietnam War and United
States war crimes, beginning with an analysis of the legality of the US entrance into the war,
then with a discussion on the US military’s behavior during the war, and finishing with a broad
survey of the effect the Vietnam War has had on international law and its application.
Beginnings of an Intervention and Laws of War
The United States first became involved in Vietnam before violent conflict actually
began. During the Cold War, the “domino theory” arose. The domino theory was the concept that
if a few regions fell to Communism, then soon all developing nations would be toppled by
Communism as well, like dominoes, and the Soviet Union win the Cold War and control the
world, threatening the United States’ national security.19 Vietnam was elevated, by the National
Security Council, to the highest level of security due to fears that all of Southeast Asia would fall
to Communism after the French left Vietnam.20 Protecting Vietnam from the influences of a

19

George F. Kennan,. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct". Foreign Affairs (25.4, 1947): 566–582.
Perry Pickert, “American Attitudes Toward International Law as Reflected in ‘The Pentagon Papers’” in
The Vietnam War and International Law ed. Richard Falk, 49-93. Vol 4. Princeton University Press
(Princeton, NJ, 1976). 56.
20

10

possibly leftist new regime became a national security priority. This line of logic lead to policies
in the early 1960s that dictated that protecting South Vietnam’s right to self-determination
became a military matter, rather than a diplomatic issue. Nation building became intervention,
and the US broke with the Geneva Accords.
Before the United States began the combat stage of its intervention in Vietnam, “[t]he
distinction between what was to be done in a covert versus an overt manner was made on the
basis of the legal requirements of the Geneva Accords.”21 The United States covertly ignored the
requirements the international legal community created for third party intervention by not
obtaining United Nations Security Council’s permission to intervene in the region, which still
applied even though the Vietnamese governments (North and South) breached treaty law overtly.
22

The United States’ role in choosing the South Vietnamese government was in violation of the

US’ treaty obligations to avoid intervention in another state’s internal affairs.23
The Crime of Aggression and Collaborative Defense
American and French involvement in the development of the Vietnamese government
actually determined the nature of the Vietnam War; technically, the war was international
conflict, and cannot be classified as a civil war because of American and French presence in the
nation before and while armed hostilities began. The Vietnamese struggle became an
international conflict because external forces (the French and the Americans) that were “High
Contracting Parties” under the Geneva Conventions involved themselves before armed conflict

21
22

Ibid, 65.
Ibid., 65.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287.
23
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began.24 Because of American involvement, the conflict cannot be divided up among the parties
based on the nature of the involvement of one party to another; dividing up the various
combatants becomes yet more confusing when one considers whether or not the Viet Cong,
North Vietnamese, and South Vietnamese forces were aligned with or party to the laws of the
Vietnamese state. The United States entrance into this conflict could be justified by the concept
that the North Vietnamese regime attacked the South Vietnamese state, which was friendly to the
United States, first. In this case, the United States would have entered the war not as an
aggressor, but as an actor of collaborative defense.
Collaborative defense describes a situation in which it is permissible for a third party to
come to the aid of one of the groups engaged in combat as a defender. This means that the third
party (in this case, the United States) may engage in warfare and defend another group only if the
defendant was not the aggressor and experienced an armed attack. Though the United States
came to the aid of South Vietnam before armed conflict began, the nature of guerrilla and civil
warfare prevents the world from knowing which party actually fired the first shot, meaning that
the United States does not have a fully sound claim to collaborative defense. Moreover, the
United States did not follow the protocol set forth in the UN Charter. Articles 33 and 34 dictate
that states may not intervene in one another’s internal affairs, let alone put troops on the ground,
without UNSC permission; states must first make a complaint to the UNSC, which has an
obligation to try every peaceful measure possible before allowing violence to take place.25

Jordan J. Paust, “Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident-- A Response to Professor Rubin” in T
 he
Vietnam War and International Law, ed. Richard Falk, 359-378. Vol 3. Princeton University Press
(Princeton, NJ, 1972). 361-362. See also: Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 2.
25
 nited Nations, Articles 33-34, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI,
U
24

http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html.

12

The North Vietnamese regime simply countered American and South Vietnamese
interests for the Vietnamese state. Under the Geneva Conventions, conflicting interests did not
constitute an attack on South Vietnam, and thus was not a valid reason for the United States to
have entered the war, since both the North and South argued that the other was the initial
aggressor.26 Though the State Department, White House, and Department of Defense argued that
the United States was acting in defense of the freedom of the South Vietnamese state and its
people, both the legal theory and the perception of events that these institutions relied upon are
questionable.27 Scholar and activist Richard Falk best synopsizes doubts over the application of
the defense justification:
[t]he real issue is whether the State Department’s interpretation of what constitutes…
[defense] has ever been recognized and accepted; or whether… the right of self defense is
restricted to instances when the necessity for action is instant, overwhelming, and leaving
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.28
Indeed, the State Department did claim that the situation in Vietnam did call for instant and
overwhelming action.29 However, the application of the right of self or collaborative defense is
questionable. American actions during this tumultuous time are unfounded; Vietnam was
threatening only in respect to the domino theory, and not actually threatening to the state security
of the United States. Self defense, under the Geneva Conventions, implies defense once one has
been attacked; the United States State Department applied the term self defense to mean defense
of state interests, rather than of the state or the states’ allies territories and peoples.

ICRC. See also: Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Laos and Viet-Nam--A Prescription for Peace," (Washington, D.C., 22 May
1964), Department of State Bulletin, (8 June 1964). See also: Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, "The
Defense of the Free World," (New York, 21 May 1964), Department of State Bulletin, (8 June 1964).
28
Richard Falk, Crimes of War. Random House (New York, 1971), 196.
29
Memorandum for the President's Special Committee, "Military Implications of the US Position on
Indochina in Geneva," 17 March 1954, The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition, 1972), 451-54.
26
27
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Moreover, American intervention in Vietnam demonstrates a desire to control the fates
and governmental structures of other nations and peoples rather than a desire to defend the
defenseless. Technology and innovation following the second World War globalized American
interests, and in the second half of the 20th century, the United States and other former empires
worked to add weight to their influence in former colonies. This use of influence inherently gave
more power to the larger, more economically stable nations, which then became inherently
repressive, using the resources of the smaller, dependent state, even though the larger nation did
not officially claim control of the smaller. “Multinational corporations, arms sales, and training
programs… all exert[ed] an… interventionary influence” even without the use of a military as
the economic elite in capitalist nations pressed for specific government programs in the occupied
state.30 Even if the North and South in Vietnam had reunified and never came to blows,
American and French influence and presence would have affected Vietnam’s autonomy.
Before discussing the war crimes that the United States committed, one must first
understand the principles of international law and decide whether or not the laws of war are
applicable to United States involvement in Vietnam. Many regard the Vietnam War as an armed
conflict since the Congress never declared war upon any Vietnamese state. This does not excuse
American atrocities. The Geneva Conventions bind nations in any armed conflict in which either
war is declared officially by a party or in which one party occupies the territory of another and
engages in armed hostility with another party.31 Even in the absence of a declaration of war
international laws of war apply, following Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.32 This is

Richard Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty, Holmes & Meier Publishers (New York, 1981). 131.
ICRC. See also: Gertrude Chelimo, “Defining Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law”,
Student Pulse: Law and Justice (2011).
32
ICRC, Article 2.
30
31
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true in the United States as a constitutionally enforced principle, because Article VI, Section II of
the Constitution declares that “all treaties made… under the authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme law of the land.”33
The United States had never denied the applicability of international law or warfare to
American military actions in Vietnam. Moreover, the Department of State declared in 1966 that
“the rules of international...armed conflict apply regardless of any declaration of war,” repeating
the words of Article Two of the Geneva Convention.34
Nevertheless, the military did not follow the rules of warfare that the United States had
signed into law. When the Viet Cong began breaking the rules of warfare, the American military
did as well. The United States may have only been following the Viet Cong’s example, but the
“the laws of war continually apply to both sides in a conflict, irrespective of whether the other
side has committed or is committing frequent violations of these laws.”35
Defense by claiming that the other side was also committing a crime is called a tu quoque
defense, and was unsuccessfully employed at Nuremberg by Nazi war criminals on trial.36 The
Vietcong resorted to more brutal guerilla tactics, which put American leaders in a confusing
position of deciding what was militarily necessary to defeat the enemy; if the other side begins
committing crimes to gain more ground, how could the American military hope to win the war

33

United States Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 2. “This constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of
the United States shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.” The United
States Congress ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1955 after signing the treaty in 1949.
34
Anthony D’Amato, Harvey L. Gould, and Larry D. Woods, “War Crimes and Vietnam: The Nuremberg
Defense and the Military Service Resistor”, California Law Review, (Vol 57, Is 5, 1969).
35
Ibid.
36
For more information on the tu quoque defense and the Nuremberg Tribunal’s ruling of inadmissibility,
see: Nicole A. Heise, “Deciding Not to Decide: Nuremberg and the Ambiguous History of the Tu Quoque
Defense”, Social Science Research Network (2009).
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without committing those same crimes? Rather than follow the laws of war, the American
military resorted to dirtier and dehumanizing tactics. The line between what was wrong and what
was necessary to win the war was blurred for American combatants and the United States
ignored the international law and precedent that dictated that it was still expected to follow the
rules of warfare. As the war moved farther away from permissible combat, the more
overwhelming the sense of lawlessness and violence became for combatants on the ground.
Atrocity Crimes and the American Soldier
This atmosphere of brutality was the context in which horrific massacres occurred, like
Son My and My Lai. The environment bred confusion, and violence; it confused the military’s
goals, so that military leaders pressed commanders for high body counts, with fewer other goals,
a trend that several Vietnam veterans called “body count mania.”37 Captain Michael O’Mera
noted after his discharge that “the command emphasis on body count was so tremendous that it
was felt… at the lowest level,” and that “the only measure of success in Vietnam… seemed to be
body count.”38 The goal of the war, as the captain saw and experienced, was not to free Vietnam,
but to “wage war against the Vietnamese people.”39 According to Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, states must protect the lives, well-being, and dignity of any person that is not a
confirmed combatant, regardless of their race or ethnicity.40 Instead, American soldiers

Robert B. Johnson, “Statement on Policy and Command,” ed. The Citizens Commission of Inquiry, The
Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam, (Vintage Books, New York, 1971), 47.
38
Michael O’Mera, “Statement on Policy and Command,” ed. The Citizens Commission of Inquiry, The
Dellums Committee Hearings on War Crimes in Vietnam, (Vintage Books, New York, 1971), 71.
39
Ibid., 73.
40
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Article 3, Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS
287, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36d2.html.
37
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systematically brutalized Vietnamese civilians in order to leave potential Viet Cong combatants
with no material resources.
The Mekong Delta saw unrivaled brutality as the target of Operation Speedy Express.
OSE was a major air operation intended to cleanse the Delta of Viet Cong operatives via
helicopter warfare, most significantly in what were called free fire zones. Free fire zones were
areas in which civilians were told to leave before a certain time. After that time, the American
military would “shoot anything that ran,” and raze the surrounding villages in order to purge
them of Viet Cong.41 Air warfare became a mark of the American military’s depreciation of
Vietnamese lives by allowing combatants to overlook the differences between Viet Cong and
civilians, in that they were instructed to fire at will at any movement, rather than engaging with
another human.
Air warfare was much safer for American soldiers, but it also made for far more
gratuitous violence.42 Pressure for a body count that likely far exceeded the number of actual
enemy combatants led to the 9th Air Division (one of the air divisions responsible for Operation
Speedy Express) having the lowest weapons-captured-to-enemies-killed ratio in the entire
Vietnam War-- meaning the 9th Division killed the most people who were likely to have only
been civilians, as they were completely unarmed at the time of their deaths.43
The 9th Air Division’s mistakes are demonstrative of the body count mania that
characterized the orders military leaders gave. The testimony of many Vietnam veterans,
including that of the Concerned Sergeant, highlighted the haunting and omnipresent press for a
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higher and higher body count.44 The Concerned Sergeant expressed his concern at the violence
taking place, and at the pressure from his commanding officer to “shoot anything that move[d]”
in a public letter to General Westmoreland.45 The logic of the extremely high body count goal
was that to decrease the dead rural Vietnamese population meant to decrease the strategic base of
support and number of potential new members for the Viet Cong, regardless of the criminality of
this tactic.46
The devaluing of Vietnamese life became endemic in the American military. Evidence of
possible war crimes came into the light through the testimony of soldiers returning from the
field, like Captain O’Mera and the Concerned Sergeant. In addition to his comments on aerial
warfare, the Concerned Sergeant also reported that “it was common to detain an unarmed
civilian and force them to walk in front of [a unit] in order to trip enemy booby traps.”47 This
practice is a direct violation of the rules of war as laid out in the Geneva Convention, as it
constitutes “wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to [the] body” of a civilian.48
Declassified Army investigation papers show that evidence was found to support the Concerned
Sergeant’s claims, and the similar claims of other military personnel, confirming American
violations of the laws of war.49 Unfortunately, even though legislation was drafted in Congress to
create sufficient judicial resources to prosecute American war criminals,
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in the period after the disclosure of the My Lai massacre, when the legislation had the
greatest prospect of winning approval, [the President and Attorney General] were
deficient in the moral qualities that might have...provide[d] Congress with political
leadership,
and the several attempts Congresspeople made to reign in the Vietnam conflict were defeated.50
Had President Nixon or Attorney General John Newton Mitchell been different men, the history
of the Vietnam War would be wildly different.
While individuals should be held responsible for their crimes, some crimes of war may
be blamed on individuals, the daily practices and expectations that the American military
engaged in built the culture of violence that allowed war crimes to occur. The My Lai massacre
is one of the most striking examples of this environment, but the daily atrocities that took place
created a context in which My Lai seemed acceptable and encouraged a disregard for
Vietnamese life. The scholars Orville and Jonathan Schell wrote in a letter to the New York
Times that Army units were being ordered not to “generate” any more refugees, because the field
pacification camps in which the Army held displaced persons were becoming too full.51 After
that decision,
peasants were not warned before an airstrike was called in on their village… The usual
warnings by helicopter loudspeaker or air dropped leaflets were stopped...They were
killed in their villages because there was no room for them in the swamped pacification
camps. It was under these circumstances of official acquiescence to the destruction of the
countryside and its people that the massacres of… [My Lai] occurred.52
It is as though the American military taught its forces that when in doubt, kill.
Punishment? The Dearth of Courts Martial
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When courts-martial did occur in order to address the criminality of certain actions, they
were often to try individual combatants, and not commanding officers. Moreover, these
individuals were not charged with war crimes, but with murder or manslaughter, despite these
actions falling directly under the United States Army Field Manual.53 The Army Field Manual’s
1956 laws of land warfare are specific on what types of actions constitute war crimes, and what
treaties soldiers are obligated to adhere to. The Manual dictates specifically that “at the request
of a party to the conflict, an enquiry shall be instituted… concerning any alleged violation of the
[Geneva] Convention.”54 Members of the American media, American government, and the
American military repeatedly called for the investigation of potential war crimes perpetrated in
the Vietnam War; by not opening any such investigation at the request of parties to the conflict,
the United States Army violated its own laws of warfare. Moreover, the Manual acknowledges
that the United States is signatory to Article 146 of the Geneva Convention, which orders that
Contracting Parties
shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of
their nationality, before i ts own courts.55
By prosecuting members of the armed forces for murder or manslaughter rather than the war
crimes they actually committed, the United States Army breached the international, domestic,
and military law by which it was governed. International legal scholars like Richard Falk,
Gabriel Kolko, and Jonathan Schell wrote eloquent and outraged books, letters, and opinion
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articles, but to no avail; even the American people could not compel the American government
or military to properly prosecute its servicemen.56
The Trial of Captain John Kapranopoulos
The court martial of Captain John Kapranopoulos is a particularly disturbing case study.
Kapranopoulos was court martialed for the murder of two Vietnamese civilians, though his
actions were clearly under what the Army Field Manual calls a violation of the laws of war.
When asked what to do with an unarmed and unidentified captured Vietnamese noncombatant,
Kapranopoulos told his soldiers “I don’t care about prisoners, I want a body count, I want that
man shot.”57 When another unarmed Vietnamese man was captured and his men asked what to
do, he replied, “Are you sh***ing me?” Kapranopoulos ordered both civilians shot.58
Despite the testimony of several members of his group who witnessed and/ or took part in
the killings, Captain Kapranopoulos was found innocent of premeditated murder. While the
evidence may have proved Kapranopoulos guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the circumstances
in which the trial occurred probably affected the ability of the panel to find against the young
captain. All courts-martial were heard by panels before 1969. When the courts-martial took place
in Vietnam, these panels were made up of active combat commanders; declaring Kapranopoulos
guilty would have been difficult for men likely sympathetic to his predicament, given that they
were physically and mentally surrounded by the culture of dehumanization of the Vietnamese.59
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The Kapranopoulos decision is an example of the devaluation of Vietnamese lives, and enforces
the statement that “military courts sometimes follow[ed] the unofficial ‘mere gook’ rule.”60
Public Outcry and International Response
Americans and the international community noticed this atmosphere of brutality.
Veterans and members of the media tried to spread the word about the atrocities being
committed by writing to American leadership like the Concerned Sergeant did, by giving
testimony as many veterans did in the film Hearts and Minds, or by testifying in
non-prosecutorial Congressional hearings.61 The military continued holding courts martial
without charging any of the accused with war crimes, and the American federal judicial system
also did not prosecute any military personnel for their actions in the war.
If the United States had an interest in prosecuting members of the military for their
actions in Vietnam, it could have without contradicting any domestic or foreign precedent. . In
the United States, military personnel may not be prosecuted for crimes abroad in state courts, but
they could have been prosecuted in federal courts.62 Similarly, joint offenses committed by
military personnel abroad and domestically are classically tried by military courts and civilian
courts, which could have been employed by the United States during Vietnam.63 Unfortunately,
in 1971 the federal government announced that it would not prosecute veterans who had violated
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international law due to the lack of precedent for doing so in the American legal system and the
political controversy prosecution could cause.64
American military law is extremely complicated, consisting of many different written and
unwritten codes and practices, compounded by the military’s separation from the domestic
judicial system. Many in the military argue that servicemen and women cannot be tried in a
domestic court with a civilian jury because such a jury would not be a jury of the servicemen’s
peers.65 The military’s own codes promote the policy of prosecuting soldiers for crimes without
calling them war crimes. “The Manual for Courts-Martial...provides that… a specific violation of
the [US Army Field Manual] should be charged rather than a violation of the law of war.”66 This
practice is illegal under the Geneva Conventions, and violates the very spirit of the laws of war
by favoring Americans; the US government has allowed the Army to write a law literally
excusing its soldiers from prosecution under the Geneva Conventions. The US Army Field
Manual even directly says in Paragraph 507(b) that “the US normally punishes war crimes only
if they are committed by enemy nationals.”67 During the 1950s, when writing its Field Manuals
and the Manual for Courts-Martial, the American military walled itself off from the rest of the
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American judicial system, effectively ensuring that an American soldier would never be charged
with war crimes.68
The refusal to prosecute put the pressure on the international community to handle the
blatant violations of war crimes law. The Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal answered the
call early in the Vietnam war, opening an intensive investigation on the actions of the American
military and the various international laws these actions broke. Unfortunately, the Russell
Tribunal could not prosecute; it only investigated. The Russell Tribunal recommended that
forums be held in the United States in which veterans could testify; collections of testimony led
eventually to a Congressional inquiry spearheaded by Representative Ronald Dellums. The
Dellums Committee heard four days of disturbing eye witness testimony that implicated the
military in hundreds of war crimes, and recommended the Pentagon prosecute members of the
military for their crimes in Vietnam.69
Head of the Russell Tribunal Jean Paul Sartre believed that there should have been a
permanent Nuremberg Tribunal to deal with the crimes of war.70 The temporary nature of both of
these tribunals impeded their ability to hold states accountable. Moreover, Russell Tribunal was
never intended to prosecute; Russell advocated that the international law must be enforced by
state structures and by the ideology of not perpetrating crimes in the first place, rather than
because of the condemnation of international courts or other states.71
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Since the end of the Vietnam War, international human rights law has evolved rapidly.
The generalized norms of international law as set forth in the main legal instruments on human
rights are either declaratory in stature (such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights),
nonbinding because powerful nations have not ratified, or simply discounted because there is no
body of international law enforcement .72 The American military’s blatant disregard for
international human rights and the laws of war in Vietnam best exemplifies this lack of respect
for international legal concerns. If nations as powerful as the United States ignore the treaties
they have signed, the international community can have no hope of enforcing those treaties, as
the next chapters will demonstrate.
The United States’ crimes in Vietnam went mostly unpunished. This fact tunnels through
the foundation of international law; without international prosecution or condemnation for
breaking international law, international human rights law and the rules of warfare become
useless. After World War Two, General Curtis LeMay reflected that if the Allies “had lost the
war, we all would’ve been prosecuted as war criminals.”73 The Geneva Convention and the
establishment of rules of combat were intended to ensure that regardless of who won a war, both
sides would face the consequences for taking the lives of noncombatants. The world lost a
chance to enforce this concept when leaders in the American military were not prosecuted as war
criminals.
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Chapter Two: Responsibility and Oversight in Nicaragua
Introduction:

26

For over 40 years, the United States-supported Somoza family network ruled Nicaragua
with an iron fist. The regime maintained its power by oppressing the people, keeping rural
Nicaraguans largely illiterate, intensely impoverished, and indebted to the few wealthy
landowners who benefited greatly from the Somoza dictatorship. Among these beneficiaries
were American investors who held vast shares in Nicaragua’s agricultural industry.74 Somoza’s
National Guard maintained order in the small country through violence, intimidation, and
crackdowns on the press, many members having trained at the United States’ controversial
School of the Americas.75 Despite the repression tactics Somoza and his Guard employed, a
revolutionary movement called the Frontera Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (The National
Sandinista Liberation Front) successfully overthrew the dictatorship in July of 1979, immediately
installed a leftist government, and began implementing what many conservatives in the United
States believed to be radical social changes.
While the Sandinista government reduced the rate of illiteracy in Nicaragua from 50% of
the population to just 15% in less than a year, eradicated polio in three years, and outfitted rural
communities with hospitals and health centers as well as modern food production systems, the
Reagan administration began efforts to overthrow the regime almost directly after President
Reagan’s inauguration in 1981.76 These efforts began as covert support for anti-Sandinista
groups (which from here will be referred to as contras) and developed throughout the
early-1980s into overt financial, material, and organizational support accompanied by a crippling
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economic embargo. Reagan and his administration continually encouraged support for the war
and justified US involvement by using existing Cold War anxiety and emphasizing the potential
for the spread of Soviet-style communism throughout the Western Hemisphere, even though the
Sandinistas had little contact with the USSR, and the Sandinista regime was quite dissimilar
from that of the Soviets. Reagan used rhetoric similar to that used to justify US engagement in
Vietnam, by consistently arguing that should Nicaragua remain under the leadership of the
Sandinista government, all of Latin America was vulnerable to a communist-takeover. Though
this line of thought seems illogical now, in the 21st century, the latter half of the 20th century in
the United States was dominated by this sort of anxiety, frequently referred to as the “domino
theory,” which suggested that should a few “Third World” states fall to communism, the others
in that region would as well, theoretically endangering American security interests and the
survival of democracy.77
The President used what scholar Donald R. Pfost calls “the bogey of the communist
threat” as a means to justify continued illegal intervention in Latin America, defending his war
by underscoring the common narrative of the time that portrayed the Cold War as a struggle
between good and evil, with America and democracy on one end of the spectrum, and the USSR
and communism on the other.78 Of course, as this chapter will demonstrate, the truth is much
more complicated. The contras were not “freedom fighters,” as Reagan liked to say, but were
rather dangerous paramilitary groups who tore through Nicaragua committing gruesome
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atrocities under the guise of war, outfitted and advised by US officials and CIA operatives
throughout the 1980s.79
However, though the contras were the direct perpetrators of most of these crimes, key
players in the US government were also guilty of these crimes against the laws of war. By
engaging in a proxy war that indiscriminately and intentionally targeted civilians, the United
States breached treaty obligations both by interfering in the state of Nicaragua’s affairs, forcing a
trade embargo, and supporting and advising the contras as they committed horrendous war
crimes. This chapter will demonstrate that the CIA and other US government officials were not
only complicit in these crimes, but were aware of and encouraged attacks on civilians that the
officials knew or should have known were violations of the laws of war, meaning such officials
were also in violation of international and domestic laws.
Pre-existing Law:
It is important to note before detailing the instances of criminal activity exactly what
constitutes a crime under international law, though this chapter will more thoroughly discuss
American breaches of law after detailing the crimes committed. According to Article Two of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, these laws apply even if neither party acknowledges the war or
declares war officially, meaning that regardless of Congress’ decision not to declare war against
the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, the US is and was still legally obligated to follow the
laws of war.80 Furthermore, the United States’ engagement in hostilities in Nicaragua breached
Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, which dictates that states must first
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seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means,
before engaging in behavior that would “endanger the maintenance of international peace,”
generally in the form of a formal complaint to the UN Security Council.81 Unless Nicaragua, as a
state, attacked the United States or its citizens violently and suddenly, the US had no legal right
to bypass the UN-required mediation phase.
Essentially, before engaging in any armed attack, parties to the UN Charter must make
every effort to solve the dispute, and request UNSC approval to engage in armed self- or
third-party defense.82 One should note, additionally, that the Rio Treaty of 1947 which
established the Charter of the Organization of American States (both of which the US is a party
to) have similar requirements for states preceding any use of force.83 The details of these treaty
obligations and the proceeding breaches by the Reagan Administration will be further analyzed
later in this chapter.
Domestically, in the spring of 1984 Congress rejected Reagan’s request for $21 million
of aid for the two largest contra groups, the Frontera Democrática de Nicaragua (Nicaraguan
Democratic Front, FDN) and the Alianza RevolucionDemocrática (Democratic Revolutionary
Front, ARDE), which led the Administration to use millions of dollars of discretionary funding
to support the contras.84 Congress held out until the summer of 1985, when the President’s
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domino theory rhetoric and promise to provide only “food and clothing and medicine and other
supplies for survival” won $27 million in “humanitarian” aid for the contra groups.85 While
Reagan promised to limit support to humanitarian aid, American officials, American
mercenaries, and CIA operatives were actively training contra forces, designing operations, and
supplying millions of dollars’ worth of weapons. Though technically within the President’s
power, this deception of Congress and therefore the American people inspires serious ethical
questions about the foundations of the war and American lawmakers’ understanding of aid to the
contras. This description of obligations to international treaties and the American political
community is intended to help readers understand the gravity of American involvement in the
contra’s horrific warfare in Nicaragua.
Contra Activity:
The man said ‘Stop shooting! We are civilians! I am a physician from Germany.
Don’t kill us!’ Jimmy Leo didn’t let this bother him. As the foreigner cried out again,
‘Don’t kill us!’ Jimmy Leo began firing at him, from the head down to the chest… We
were satisfied when they were all dead. 86
The rest of the account of an FDN attack on a van full of 13 civilians is too gruesome to include
in this work. In an interview with two foreign nonprofit workers (one German, the other
Mexican), Eduardo Lopez Valenzuela recounts a 1982 massacre during which three women were
brutally raped and then murdered as their ten companions, all health workers, looked on.87 Lopez
tells the interviewers about the rest of his small band’s day, during which they mutilated and
killed two other civilians.88
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The account is horrifying. Nonetheless, it is not unique, neither in the interviews that
Dieter Eich and Carlos Rincón recorded, nor in the accounts that witnesses, survivors, and other
perpetrators have given. Another former FDN militant told Eich and Rincón bluntly, “We had
attacked civilian vehicles. There were dead, seriously wounded, and we took prisoners.”89 At
first glance, it seems a description of the same attack Lopez described, but instead, it is an
account of a completely separate attack, one of the many by FDN and ARDE fighters that killed
thousands of Nicaraguans, the vast majority of them civilians, including women, children, and
the elderly.90 The contras made no attempt to suggest, as American soldiers in Vietnam had, that
the civilians they attacked were guerilla enemies; rather, as director of the FDN Adolfo Calero
told reporter Stephen Kinzer in 1984, “There is no line at all, not even a fine line, between a
civilian farm owned by the government and a Sandinista military outpost,” continuing to argue
that arbitrary killing of civilians was entirely legitimate.91 Between 1982 and 1984, 23 primary
school teachers, 135 adult education teachers, and 747 other confirmed civilian deaths at the
hands of contra militants.92 Through eyewitness testimony, from both perpetrators and victims or
witnesses, we also know that mutilation and gang-rape before death were common occurrences.
Additionally, the contras systemically conscripted an unknown number of men and
women from the countryside to fight for the anti-Sandinista cause. Though many joined
voluntarily after promises of a high pay and steady food supply, thousands of campesinos were
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kidnapped as forced recruits, especially in the northern Atlantic Coast region.93 Orlando
Wayland, who eventually escaped the contra army, described in an interview the experience of
being tied to members of his community, and forced to walk for four days and three nights,
without stopping, to a training camp in Honduras.94 “Three women gave birth on the march,”
Wayland said. “As soon as a child was out, the umbilical cord was cut and they had to go on
immediately.”95 Upon arriving at the training camp, Wayland was tortured for days, and then,
along with the other men from his village, was told that he could either fight for the contras, or
continue marching to an unknown location. Wayland chose to become a soldier, but first, he was
again tortured for two months by being tied to an ant hill, shoved underwater, tied securely in a
river for days at a time, and being beaten regularly.96 After finally being told that “whoever fled
the camp was shot on the spot,” Wayland was given training, a uniform, and a weapon, but upon
meeting the Sandinista force during his first forced battle, he was able to flee to safety.97 Though
Orlando Wayland was able to escape, many more likely were not able to; though there is no
existing data on the number or fates of forced recruits in the contra armies, the systemic manner
in which Wayland’s captors kidnapped his village and the testimony of other ex-contra leaders
suggest that Wayland’s experience may have been shared by thousands of Nicaraguan men.
The forced conscription of the campesinos is just one of the many war crimes contra
groups committed. By attacking and destroying hospitals, health centers, and religious centers,
and by kidnapping, killing, torturing, and interning women, children, the elderly, and the sick
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and wounded without proper supplies, the contras violated Articles 14, 16, 24, 27, 28, 31, 32, 50,
55, 58, 76, 78, 85, 89, and 127.98 In violating these conditions, the contras committed what the
Geneva Conventions call “grave breaches” of the laws of war. Grave breaches are defined as the
willful killing, torture, rape, forced recruitment, unlawful confinement and deportation, and
causing great physical or mental suffering.99 These crimes, of which there is indisputable
evidence, constitute the most serious violations of any laws in history, and, as this chapter will
soon argue, were supported by the United States government.

American Involvement:
The United States supported the contras by steadily supplying money, weapons, and
strategic planning, while simultaneously damaging the Nicaraguan state with a trade embargo.
These forms of aid were construed by the Reagan Administration as “humanitarian,” but in fact,
allowed the US government to exercise control over the contra groups, even during military
operations. The extent of this control is a keystone in the debate over whether or not the United
States violated international agreements. This section will demonstrate that CIA operatives (and
therefore the US) influenced contra military operations using financial support, by supplying
weaponry, and by participating in paramilitary training and strategic planning with the contras.
Financial Support:
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Between 1981 and 1986, an estimated $231 million was sent to the contras.100 The first
~$80 million sent between 1981 and 1983 was sent by the CIA with President Reagan’s
approval, without Congress’ knowledge, while the greatest aid package Congress authorized
($100 million in 1986) was labeled as humanitarian aid.101 Instead, this financial aid allowed the
contras to build up their forces, hire mercenaries, and become a fully operational army. Without
the money the US gave in the name of humanitarianism, the contras would not have been
capable of building the force that decimated villages and towns throughout Nicaragua. In an
interview with Eich and Rincón, Pedro Javier Nuñez Cabezas, one of the leaders of the FDN,
said that the FDN was able to operate only after American financial support.
Everything came from the gringos… Before that, when there were financial problems,
nothing happened, no action.102
Nuñez’ comments suggest that had the United States not sent what Nuñez described as “every
conceivable kind of support,” the FDN would not have become operational.103 This highlights the
significance of American support.
Material and Arms Support
As Nuñez said in his interview, “everything came from the gringos,” including
weaponry.104 Another contra agent, Jorge Ramirez Zelaya, noted that his group was supported
by the US “with comprehensive financial aid, with weapons, and with war material,” since 1982.
He explained that he never wanted for weapons after the Americans became involved, and that
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he was in near constant contact with Americans identifying themselves as working for the CIA.
105

Although the Reagan Administration repeatedly assured Congress that any aid given was
only humanitarian, suggesting that aid packages contained only food, clothing, and medicine,
when the ARDE claimed they had insufficient arms to take a port in 1982, the CIA began weekly
airlifts of weapons and ammunitions to ARDE camps.106 Moreover, an unnamed “Western
ambassador” told reporter Joel Brinkley that he watched planes drop “duffle bags from low
altitudes” at the Nicaraguan border throughout the spring of 1982.107 Officers from the ARDE
told Brinkley that American pilots were flying the planes and delivering arms, but that other
members of the ARDE leadership were “burning all the evidence and identification” of the
planes and their airdrops.108 One FDN member even told Eich and Rancón that though FDN
received support from other states, at least the majority of his group’s weapons were from the
gringos.109
Operational and Strategic Support
American material and financial support were vital to the contras’ ability to wage war.
However, American involvement in the planning of military operations and the training of contra
soldiers had perhaps the greatest influence on the contra war. Though CIA operatives, the
Reagan Administration, and proponents of the war in Nicaragua would later claim that
Americans had little to no influence on the activities of the contras, the evidence suggests
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otherwise. Americans served as hired mercenaries, teachers and trainers, as well as strategic
advisors within the contra structure.
In their interviews with former members of the FDN and ARDE, Eich and Rincón heard
hours of testimony about gringo leadership in contra training camps. During one such interview,
forced soldier Emerson Uriel Navarrete Medrana told the two that the Americans “gave
[Navarrete’s group] specific instructions as to what we had to do” when they entered Nicaraguan
villages and towns.110 Five other contras spoke about the Americans who not only trained their
units, but also were completely in charge of the entire training camp, with contra officers
answering to these Americans.111 This testimony is supported by the extensive research scholars
Paul Ramshaw and Tom Steers did when writing their 1987 report for the National Lawyers’
Guild. Steers and Ramshaw found that by 1984,
there [were] over 50 CIA agents and other US government agents in Honduras and Costa
Rica assisting in the war effort. Over 90 US soldiers are working with the contras and
providing training and advice,
in addition to an unverifiable number of American mercenaries actively engaging in battle in
Nicaragua.112
A former CIA operative in Central America, David C. MacMichael, told the scholars that
a plan involved in a bombing raid [of a civilian village] was shot down, and it turned out
that the flight crew were US citizens.113
While there does not appear to be sufficient evidence to say definitively whether or not
American citizens directly committed the crimes that the contras surely did; it would be rash
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without such evidence to claim that an American mercenary killed a civilian directly.
Nonetheless, American citizens witnessing and not forcibly stopping the commission of war
crimes by the contras indicates liability on the part of the United States. As will be discussed in
subsequent sections, American responsibility for contra crimes hinges on “whether the US
government actually exercise[d] operational control over the activities of the contras.”114
In addition to MacMichael’s testimony, an ARDE officer said that even during battles,
the CIA
had placed agents or trained mercenaries in key positions with the rebel group where they
dictate…. Decisions on logistics, communications, and operations.115
Additionally, Edgar Chomorro, one of the most influential leaders of the FDN, told reporters that
the CIA had advised him to “murder, kidnap, rob, and torture” those who stood in the way of the
FDN cause.116 From the testimony gathered from eyewitnesses and contras fighting both
voluntarily and involuntarily, it is clear that agents of the US government not only would have
been able to stop contra violence against civilians by changing the strategic and operational
plans that they supplied to the groups, but also were sources of encouragement for the
commission of these crimes in the first place.
Responsibility and Oversight:
“The truth is, there are atrocities going on in Nicaragua,” President Reagan
acknowledged at a fundraising dinner in 1985.117 However, despite widespread reports of contras
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committing those atrocities, the President continued to argue that the Sandinistas were violently
oppressing their people, and claim that the arms flow from Nicaragua to violent Salvadoran
rebels continued to exist when much evidence to the contrary proved that it did not.118 The CIA
and the Reagan Administration gave reason after reason for American involvement in the
conflict: first, the US needed to stop the arms flow between Nicaragua and El Salvador, but when
no evidence of such a trade existing in any significant way was found, the US had to continue to
aid the contras in order to put pressure on the Sandinistas to hold elections. In 1984, when
elections were held and declared free and fair by several international bodies, the Administration
claimed that the elections were false and fraudulent.119 Though the Nicaraguan government
fulfilled the requirements for negotiation set by the mediating states, the Reagan Administration
continued to claim that it was the Sandinistas, not the US, holding up peace negotiations.120 This
continued even after the International Human Rights Law Group submitted a report to Congress
detailing “16 alleged contra attacks on civilians… five ambushes of civilian vehicles… 11
kidnappings, and seven rapes.”121 Even after this report was filed, over $127 million was given to
the contras, and American agents continued to operate in Nicaragua.
All of these justifications for continuing the war in Nicaragua distracted from what was
actually occurring in Nicaragua. American mercenaries and officials were outfitting, arming,
funding, and training contra rebels while they violently attacked civilians in ambushes planned
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by Americans. These Americans were violating the terms of both international agreements and
domestic law by having oversight of and sufficient influence on contra military activities to stop
the contras’ criminal activity but not endeavoring to curtail the violence or prosecute those
committing it. This means that every one of the 90 US soldiers and 50 CIA and government
agents mentioned previously are responsible for contra crimes, as are President Reagan and the
“core group” of bureaucrats that controlled the Nicaraguan war from Washington, D.C.122
Additionally, the Americans running training camps and giving the contras orders are also
culpable for the crimes committed by those who took their orders.
The concept of indirect responsibility is complicated, but the behavior of American
agents is governed by several bodies of law. One of these is the Geneva Conventions, to which
the United States is a party; it has signed and ratified the treaty, and adopted its obligations into
domestic law. This means that the United States is obligated to follow the requirements of the
treaty. If it does not, it breaks international and domestic law. As this thesis has demonstrated,
the United States frequently breaches the Geneva Conventions on the law of warfare, but these
breaches should still be considered by readers as extremely serious.
An earlier section discussed the nature of the war crimes that contra groups committed,
but the United States’ role in those crimes can only be understood through an analysis of the
Geneva Conventions. First, it is important to note that Article Two of the Fourth Geneva
Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (from here, GCIV) determines
that these laws of war apply to signatory parties in any armed conflict, regardless of whether or
not those parties declare war or even openly acknowledge the war; therefore, regardless of the
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US Congress’ decision not to declare war on Nicaragua, GCIV still applies.123 Article 1 of the
GCIV requires that all parties in a conflict respect civilians, and requires signatory states to
ensure that other parties to the conflict also respect civilians.124 The United States broke this
obligation not only by refusing to stop the contra’s violence against civilians, but also by
encouraging and training contras to “murder, kidnap, rob, and torture.”125 The terms of
respecting civilians are outlined in Article 147, which details what actions constitute grave
breaches of the laws of war; as noted earlier, these actions include murder, kidnapping, robbery,
torture, rape, and forced conscription, all of which evidence demonstrates the contras committed.
126

The United States had a duty to stop these crimes. The government clearly exercised a
degree of operational control over the contras to be capable of preventing the outright strategy of
harming civilians. As one ex-Marine turned mercenary said, “massacres of civilians are not
scattered human rights abuses… but rather the game plan.”127 Not only does the GCIV require
the United States, as a High Contracting Party, to search for and try known perpetrators of such
grave breaches, but moreover, the US is deemed directly responsible for the actions of its agents
by Article 29 of the GCIV.128 Though the US signed and ratified these laws without an open
treaty reservation, the state has consistently broken the terms of the GCIV through its actions in
Vietnam and Nicaragua, among other conflict zones. Nonetheless, the only international court
that was able to try states before the creation of the International Criminal Court in 2000 was the
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International Court of Justice, to which Nicaragua brought a complaint against the United States
in 1984.
The ICJ released its decision in Nicaragua v. USA on June 27, 1986. The opinion
established that the United States was responsible for financing, training, equipping, arming, and
organizing the contras, and ordered the US to stop its attack on the Nicaraguan state.129 The
Court relied upon the charter of the Organization of American States’ Article 19, which, like
Article Two of the Charter of the United Nations, dictates that
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle
prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural
elements.130
In Nicaragua v. US, the Court found that the US, by supporting the contras in such a concrete
manner, had violated its treaty obligations to the OAS and UN. The Court also rejected the US’
claim that its actions in the war were in the name of collective self defense, and ordered the US
to cease all material support for the contras.131
Nonetheless, the Court did not mention whether or not it found the US responsible for the
contras’ actions. It did not hold contra fighters or their American directors responsible for
international crimes, though it was within the Court’s purview to do so. This action (or rather,
inaction) by the Court was likely politically motivated; a decision against the United States, one
of its most fervent proponents, would bring hostile criticism upon the Court. By deciding with
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the standing law, but without actually holding Americans responsible for the grave breaches of
the laws of war, the Court avoided some of that criticism.132
Regardless of the completeness of the Court’s opinion, the Reagan Administration
refused to acknowledge it. After the ruling, a State Department spokesman dismissed the case,
saying that it was demonstrative of the Court’s inability to handle cases of such a complex
nature.133 The Administration continued to argue that the Court did not have jurisdiction, and that
the Court did not have access to sensitive materials that would excuse the American interference.
In several editorials, the New York Times pledged its support for the Administration in the case,
writing that “there was legitimate doubt whether Nicaragua had proper standing… to bring this
case before the World Court.”134 This position, publicized by one of the largest news media
organizations in the United States, lent considerable legitimacy to the Reagan Administration’s
position among the American people, regardless of the fact that it was technically incorrect. The
court of public opinion did not call for the prosecution of members of the administration or CIA
for its actions in Nicaragua, let alone the President himself, despite his openly breaking domestic
law.
One of the most direct breaches of American law that the President broke was the Boland
Amendment. Signed on December 21, 1982, the Boland Amendment was a rider attached to the
House Appropriations Bill of 1982, as well as to the Defense Appropriations Acts of 1982 and
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1983.135 The Amendment prohibits the use of funds to overthrow the government of Nicaragua.
Indeed, in 1984, the President issued an assurance that
the US does not seek to destabilize or overthrow the government of Nicaragua; nor to
impose or compel any particular form of government there,136
though he said in February of 1985, and again on repeated occasion, that the goal was to make
the Sandinista government “say uncle.”137 Reagan did not simply break his promises to Congress
to only give humanitarian aid, he also broke a domestic law that he, not his predecessors or the
international community, signed into law when he signed the House Appropriations Bill, and the
two Defense Appropriations Bills. Nonetheless, no one was prosecuted.
Justification:
The Reagan Administration defended its interference in Nicaragua using what this author
will call the “Thanks, Communism” tactic. This strategy consisted of constant assurances from
the President and other proponents of the contras that the Sandinistas were going to cause the fall
of Latin America to communism. Anything and everything that happened in Latin America in
the latter half of the 20th century that negatively impacted the United States was blamed on
communism, even in instances where the Soviet state or its doctrine were not at all involved.
The State Department actively engaged in propagating this Cold War anxiety. In 1985,
the State Department released a white paper on the Nicaraguan revolution that quoted
Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge Martinez as saying “this revolution goes beyond our
borders.”138 The white paper suggested that this quotation was conclusive proof that the
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Sandinistas had intentions to export leftist revolutions to the rest of Latin America. However, the
State Department very seriously, and perhaps intentionally, misrepresented what Borge actually
said by taking this quotation out of context; Borge’s full quotation describes the Sandinista
revolution as part of a new era in Latin America of independence from military dictatorships.139
Nonetheless, the damage was already done; the white paper had been published, and added to
anxiety among Americans over the small Central American nation, allowing the Reagan
Administration to use that anxiety to promote the war. The President and his proponents
threatened political opponents with being “soft on communism,” which “heighten[ed] the
domestic political costs of opposing the President.”140 Though under the UN Charter and the
Geneva Conventions war may only be started for self- or third party-defense, by arguing that the
contra war was preventing the dangerous spread of communism, Reagan expanded the definition
of self-defense, helping to promote the concept’s ever-expanding elasticity that has enabled
states to wage war with little restraint since signing laws prohibiting wars of aggression.141
Consequences and Conclusion:
The consequences of the United States’ war in Nicaragua have been vast and important.
First, the US’ actions in supporting the contras brought heavy criticism of the Reagan
Administration from the international community. Second, the US’ decision not to prosecute any
contras for their crimes or any American officials for their oversight in those crimes has had a
deep impact on international criminal law. International condemnation of American activities
wrought damage on American credibility abroad. A delegation of “Concerned European
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Parliamentarians” wrote President Reagan a public letter warning that the US’ actions in
Nicaragua would threaten NATO alliances.142 In 1983, the UN General Assembly condemned the
intervention, and throughout the 1980s, leaders from states all over the world objected to the US
unauthorized use of force and support for the contras.143 By 1985, the Institute for Policy Studies
released a report that began by noting that “American credibility with nations that are most
important to our national welfare…is eroding.”144 Though the Reagan Administration nor the
CIA was prosecuted for its responsibility for contra crimes, American relationships abroad
suffered greatly after the war.
There are many reasons why no American was held accountable for the war crimes
committed in Nicaragua. These reasons will appear similar to those given for the lack of
substantial prosecution efforts during and after the Vietnam War presented in the previous
chapter. Foremost, there is no international body capable of forcing the United States to try an
American citizen, let alone to export a citizen for trial in an international court. Even in the
1980s, the United States possessed the most powerful military in the world; there is very little on
this earth that could force the United States government to do anything. As scholar Patrick
Hagopian writes,
this situation places the onus of responsibility on the US for ensuring that its own legal
institutions and courts respect and observe the same standards it has promulgated through
its… participation in international tribunals.145
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For a citizen to be prosecuted for crimes in Nicaragua, the American government would have to
request and begin the prosecution, which is extremely unlikely. Such a prosecution would be
seen as an admission of guilt on the part of the United States, admitting that the government had
broken the law and done wrong, which would have such great political consequences
internationally and domestically that it simply will not happen. That the ICJ refused to
acknowledge American responsibility for contra actions tacitly allowed the US government to
also continue to refuse to acknowledge this responsibility. If there is no allegiance to the law, the
law is powerless; in engaging in contra activities, and in refusing to prosecute either contras or
the Americans who aided them, the United States demonstrated its allegiance not to the law, but
to its exemption from that law, contributing to the weakness of international criminal law.
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Chapter Three: Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo and the Law
Introduction:
The breakdown of the former Yugoslavia was a violent, long-lasting, and ethnically
charged process. The territories that now make up Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia,
Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herçegovina were torn by pre-existing ethnic and religious tensions
exacerbated by the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. This chapter will focus mainly on
the human rights violations committed by the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) during
the spring of 1999 in Kosovo, but to understand the context of NATO’s actions, we must first
discuss the context in which they took place.
In 1989, as the USSR’s growing weakness destabilized the Balkan region, the Serbian
government officially revoked Kosovo’s status as an autonomous province within the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.146 As the rest of the Balkans underwent violent transformations
into Serbian authoritarianism that accompanied rising Serbian nationalism, Kosovo remained
largely peaceful; nonetheless, as the early 1990s passed, Kosovo became the site of government
oppression of Kosovar Albanians, an ethnic group with a long history of conflict with Serbs.147
From these conditions sprung the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which developed into a fierce
guerilla army that clashed with Serbian police forces, spurring even more state-sanctioned
violence.148 NATO allies watched as the Balkans spun even further into a cycle of indiscriminate
violence and a campaign of ethnic cleansing began. Many have criticized NATO’s hesitance to
act, suggesting that had the West intervened sooner, thousands of lives would have been saved
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from Slobodan Milosevic’s humanitarian abuses, and from the displacement the Balkan wars
caused.149
Milosevic’s strategy for overtaking Kosovo was to incite Serbian nationalists in the
reason, even going so far as to arm civilians Serbs and encourage them to use those weapons
against Kosovar Albanians.150 Riots, muggings, rapes, and kidnappings ensued at the hands of
the police as well as armed civilians in the name of protecting Yugoslavia from “Albanian
secessionists” who may or may not have existed. Moreover, Milosevic and his army began a
campaign of ethnic cleansing, attempting to drive out or kill the Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo.
While thousands of Albanians emigrated to neighboring countries as Milosevic became more and
more oppressive, thousands more stayed as the Serbian state physically intimidated,
economically and socially marginalized, and limited the rights of Kosovar Albanians.151 By the
late 1990s, Serbian forces were driving an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Albanian
population all over Yugoslavia, but most intensely focused on Kosovo.
People all across the world called for the Western powers to step in. Though NATO had
been involved in the Balkan wars before the 1999 bombing campaign, Kosovo had been left
untouched; however, the Kosovo region became especially violent along ethnic lines because
Serbs and Albanians have fought over the land for centuries.152 As Kosovar Albanians realized
that nonviolence was ineffective against Milosevic and the KLA began contributing to the
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violence, the international community looked on. This chapter will analyze the decision making
process that led to NATO’s Operation Allied Force, a 78-day bombing campaign, and the
international legal theory behind it.
Alliance Politics, and Decisions
The Decision Making Process
One of the chief criticisms of Operation Allied Force is the means by which NATO came
to the decision to bomb Kosovo. Every member of NATO has signed and ratified the Geneva
Conventions as well as the United Nations Charter, meaning each state is bound to the
procedures detailed in the Conventions and the Charter.153 The UN Charter dictates the structure
of the UN, while the Geneva Conventions are generally thought of as the laws of modern
warfare.154 According to Articles 33 and 34 of the UN Charter, states must bring their complaints
against one another to the UN Security Council before taking any action, military or economic.155
The UNSC has the authority to draft resolutions imposing sanctions, embargoes, and allowing
states to use violence, but its ultimate goal is to maintain international peace and security.156
Without a UNSC permission, a state is breaking international law of war by committing violence
against or within another state; that violence is considered a war of aggression.157 In the case of
Operation Allied Force, NATO did not receive UNSC permission to bomb Kosovo.
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However, the UNSC did release several resolutions attempting to quell the violence in the
Balkan states. In 1998, the UNSC passed Resolution 1160, which officially condemned Serbian
use of violence against the people of Kosovo, as well as established an arms embargo. This
meant that to sell or bring arms into the Balkan region became a crime.158 Later the same year,
the UNSC adopted Resolution 1199. Resolution 1199 noted that an arms flow to the Balkan
states had continued after 1160, and firmly demanded that all actors, including guerilla groups
and Milosevic’s police force, commit to an immediate ceasefire. It also calls on Milosevic’s
government to cease its targeting of the civilian population in Kosovo, and to allow refugees to
return to their homes.159 The violence did not stop. Indeed, the targeting of Kosovar Albanian
civilians seemed to increase in late 1998, bringing more calls to the international community to
intervene.160 In October of 1998, the UNSC condemned the Yugoslav government, and endorsed
NATO efforts to keep Milosevic and his officials in peace negotiations, but also noted that those
negotiations were not having the desired effect. It also reaffirmed the UNSC’s previous demand
for all violent actors to commit to a ceasefire, and urged states outside the region to commit
humanitarian aid. Finally, it called for the full participation in and cooperation with the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia by Yugoslav forces and leaders.161 These were
the final UNSC resolutions released before the NATO bombing that began on March 24, 1999,
and clearly never gave NATO, or any actor, permission to conduct an aerial campaign, or any
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other military action. Nonetheless, it is notable that the Yugoslav government was able to
completely ignore these resolutions by the institution that was intended to be the most powerful
on earth. With no enforcement mechanism, the UNSC’s resolutions did basically nothing to
actually stop the violence taking place in the Balkans. Though NATO’s use of force without the
UNSC’s endorsement was illegal and a breach of the UN Charter, the UN’s efforts accomplished
little. In October of 1998, soon after Resolution 1203 was released, NATO declared that
airstrikes would be launched “if Milosevic broke [a previous agreement to] withdraw one-third
of his troops from Kosovo, and the KLA was expected to cease its attacks as well.”162
The Decision to Act and Rambouillet
One of the most outspoken leaders within NATO was Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
The American media even nicknamed the conflict in Kosovo “Madeleine’s War,” and
consistently suggested that her passion (and thus, the United States’ involvement) for
intervention in the Balkans was caused by her own personal history as a refugee, first from
Hitler’s Prague, and then from the Soviet takeover of Belgrade in the mid-20th century.163
Regardless of the source of Albright’s interest in the conflict, her leadership as the first female
Secretary of State drove NATO to action. In 1999, during Operation Allied Force, she told a
Time Magazine reporter: “Just because you can’t act everywhere doesn’t mean you don’t act
anywhere.”164 Albright continually argued for humanitarian intervention, ushering the United
States into a new role as “the indispensable nation asserting its morality as well as its interests to
assure stability, stop thugs, and prevent human atrocities.”165 Albright led NATO’s charge to
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bring Kosovar Albanian leaders and Milosevic’s representatives to the negotiation table in
Rambouillet, France in February of 1999.
John Norris, a State Department official, describes the Rambouillet Conference in his
memoir about the conflict, Collision Course. Norris notes that the Albanians present at the talks
represented such varied, disparate groups were “mutually distrustful,” and did not hold the actual
power needed to negotiate.166 More importantly, Yugoslav President Milosevic did not attend the
talks himself, instead sending several delegates who held low positions in his government, and
were effectively powerless; Norris also reported that these delegates drank heavily.167 On top of
these issues, Russia, which held the most sway over the Milosevic regime, made clear at the
negotiations that it hoped the talks would collapse.168 Norris argued that
the view from Russia… was that the US and its allies were now committed to an
ambitious new program of humanitarian intervention with NATO serving as the world’s
policeman,
an obvious reason for Russia to benefit from the failure of the conference.169 In short, the
conference was “doomed to failure from the start.”170 Though Kosovar representatives signed the
conference’s agreement that gave Kosovo autonomy with NATO ground troops as peacekeepers,
the Serbian delegation refused to sign, continuing to state that Kosovo belonged to Yugoslavia,
and rejecting a clause that would have allowed NATO unrestricted access throughout
Yugoslavia.171 With Russia the only delegation that could impact Milosevic without a threat of
force, the talks fell apart quickly. The delegates watched as Organization for Security and
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Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors reported Serbian and Yugoslav forces organizing
themselves around Kosovo’s border with Serbia proper, a clear indication that Milosevic was
planning a large scale offensive against the Kosovo territory.172
On March 20th, 1999, Milosevic and Serbian forces launched a new offensive against
Kosovar Albanians after a winter of increasing the number of military and paramilitary members
in Kosovo.173 Where previously only police forces had clashed against KLA members during
riots and seemingly random acts of violence, the weeks immediately preceding Operation Allied
Force saw an increase in military deployments to the area. In January, 1999, the KLA ambushed
a group of Serbian police officers south of Pristina. The government responded by conducting a
summary execution of 45 ethnic Albanians in the village of Racak in a massacre that was
photographed by monitors from the OSCE.174 The well-documented carnage brought an outcry
from the international community, which, weeks later, watched as Milosevic began “Operation
Horseshoe” on March 20th, days after the Rambouillet Conference officially ended.
During the conference, NATO received reports from the Austrian government and later
the German government that Milosevic was preparing a large-scale offensive against Kosovar
Albanians; these reports alleged that planning for this operation began in the fall of 1998, months
before the Rambouillet peace talks failed.175 The OSCE withdrew its monitors on March 20th,
resulting in a dramatic escalation of violence in Kosovo known as Operation Horseshoe.176 It has
been nearly impossible for observers to accurately track civilian casualties as a result of
Operation Horseshoe, largely because Milosevic used NATO bombings as a scapegoat for
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civilian casualties, and claimed that those killed or detained were actually Albanian militant
rebels.
Despite the fogginess of data, it is clear that Operation Horseshoe was an ethnic cleansing
campaign. Immediately after OSCE monitors left the Balkans, Serbian and Yugoslav forces
began burning villages, committing mass executions, and forcing thousands of Kosovar
Albanians to leave their homes.177 Much of this violence was shielded by the confusion caused
by the NATO bombings that began on March 24, 1999.
The Air Campaign:
Just after eight in the evening on March 24, NATO began bombing military targets using
planes flying around 15,000 feet above Kosovo.178 That night, NATO forces struck 40 military
targets and shot down three Yugoslav planes.179 Throughout the 78 day air campaign, pilots
continued to fly at high altitudes, following a strategy designed to minimize NATO casualties.
Though Milosevic claimed his troops shot down the helicopter, the only NATO military
members to die were killed in non-combat helicopter crash that the US Army determined was a
mechanical malfunction.180
However, Operation Allied Force caused literally incalculable civilian casualties.181 In its
study of the Kosovo humanitarian crisis, Human Rights Watch (HRW) found that there were 90
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separate incidents involving civilians deaths during NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign.182
According to the data HRW presents, between 278 and 317 civilians died in Kosovo alone.183
While these casualties are tragic, and horrifying, they should be considered as quite different
from the civilians deaths discussed in previous chapters. In Vietnam and Nicaragua, Americans
willfully and knowingly caused harm to the civilian populations, whether by attacking them
directly without evidence that they were involved with the enemy, or by supporting groups that
targeted civilians. Conversely, in Kosovo, the civilian casualties were accidental. Though NATO
could have done more strategically to lessen the likelihood of civilians deaths, those deaths were
fundamentally not intentional, protecting NATO troops and officers from being responsible for
war crimes.

International Law and its Application
Intentionality is key to determining responsibility when considering violence that affects
civilians. Were civilians the target of an armed attack? Did the attackers take appropriate
measures to ensure civilian safety? What was the motivation behind the attack in the first place?
As one can imagine, the answers to these questions fall on the spectrum between objective and
subjective; finding evidence of such a nature is complicated, and the context of decisions is very
important. This section will analyze the laws surrounding civilian casualties caused by NATO’s
airstrikes, and then the legality of NATO’s involvement in the conflict as a whole.
Civilian Deaths and the Nature of Air Campaigns.
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On April 14th, 1999, NATO pilots bombed what they believed, from an altitude of over
15,000 feet, was a military convoy on the Djakovica-Decan Road for about two hours.184
Tragically, the convoy was not made up solely of military vehicles, as NATO strategists had
previously thought. Instead, the 12-mile stretch that pilots bombed repeatedly was filled with
Kosovar Albanian refugees, being escorted (or deported) by several military vehicles.185 73
confirmed deaths were civilians, and another 36 civilians were injured.186 As more information
was released by witnesses and human rights groups, NATO’s response changed from insistence
that the convoy was solely military, to a confession of a tragic mistake; many, including
monitors from HRW, see this change in message as a sign that the bombing was sincerely not
meant to harm civilians, and that NATO genuinely believed that there would be no civilian loss
of life.187 Additionally, HRW and the International Red Cross were unable to find any evidence
suggesting that anyone within the NATO operation had any knowledge of civilians within the
Djakovica-Decan convoy.188 What this means, then, is that NATO did not commit a war crime,
for it did not knowingly or intentionally gravely breach any of the Geneva Conventions.
Nonetheless, NATO’s use of airstrikes in lieu of military action that could be more
accurate in targeting does inspire questions about NATO’s adherence to Protocol I of the Geneva
Conventions. Protocol I generally protects civilians, and by signing it, each member state agreed
that it “must take all precautions to avoid or minimize harm to civilians, and to this end may not
attack… combatants and civilians indiscriminately.”189 Before the Djakovica-Decan bombings,
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NATO’s policy was to have its pilots fly and bomb from at least 15,000. Even with the advanced
technology available, weather changes and the limits of technology and human eyesight may
have impaired NATO’s ability to take adequate measures to protect civilians. As HRW’s report
declared,
if precision would have been greater… had NATO pilots flown lower, it could be argued
that there may have been a point at which NATO was obligated to have its pilots fly
lower.190
By choosing the less accurate strategic option and having high flying pilots rather than ground
troops or even bombing from a lower altitude, NATO violated humanitarian law. Each member
state pledged upon signing the Geneva Conventions that it would take every precaution to protect
the lives of civilians. Though the decision to go through with an aerial campaign may have saved
countless military men and women, it resulted in excessive civilian casualties because NATO
was not able to properly identify and verify many of the objects it bombed far below its planes. It
is likely that ground troops or even lower flying planes would have been capable of properly
avoiding civilian casualties.191 While NATO has an inherent interest in and right to value the
lives of its soldiers and pilots, it also has a legal obligation to value the lives of civilians over the
lives of its troops; not surprisingly, however, this principle falls into a political and moral gray
area for many world leaders.
NATO’s Entrance into the Conflict
By entering what was previously an internal conflict, NATO transformed the Balkan
wars into an international armed conflict. This meant that on March 24th, 1999, at approximately
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8:01PM, as soon Operation Allied Force dropped its first bombs, the “full body of international
humanitarian law applied” to all of the Yugoslav region, making Milosevic and his soldiers
responsible for their crimes not only within Yugoslav laws, but also international laws.192 This
allowed the United Nations to form the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), and to bring Milosevic and other Yugoslav decision-makers to justice for
their crimes.193 Though NATO’s entrance into the conflict was contrary to its member-states’
obligations Articles 33 and 34 of the UN Charter, the ICTY was able to support its claims to
jurisdiction over the Yugoslav criminals because the conflict was international.
Nonetheless, the alliance did breach its UN obligations by committing violence without
UNSC approval. Furthermore, it committed the act of aggression by entering the conflict when
no NATO member-state had been attacked. As discussed in previous chapters, Article Two of
the Geneva Conventions ensure the the laws of war apply even when the parties involved do not
declare war officially.194 The legal definitions surrounding the crime of aggression are
complicated and nuanced, and have been hotly debated since states began codifying customary
law together in the post-Great War world. After the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact codified an
agreement between dozens of nations not to use war or violence to settle disputes, states needed
a solid definition of the crime of aggression, which led to the 1933-1934 Conventions for the
Definition of Aggression (CDA).195 These conventions were signed and ratified by the League
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of Nations member-states, several Middle Eastern states, and most of Northern and Eastern
Europe, and declared that the crime of aggression would be defined as:
Declaration of war upon another state; Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a
declaration of war, of the territory of another state; Attack by its land, naval, or air forces,
with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another state;
Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state; and, provision of support to armed
bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another state...196
Many international legal scholars argue that this definition has been in use for so many
generations that it has become a part of international customary law.197 However, defining
customary law is notoriously difficult because it is based not on any tangible document or
written standard, but rather on the practices of states and the laws to which they have actually
adhered.198
After the CDA came World War Two, and with it, the Nuremberg Protocols, which
formed the foundation of the United Nations and modern international law. Principal VI,
Paragraph A of the Nuremberg Protocols defines a crime against peace as the
[p]lanning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation
of international treaties, agreements or assurances; [and the] participation in a common
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned [in the previous
clause].199
Though this definition is noticeably different from that outline by the CDA, but it carries the
same ultimate message when applied to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo: NATO, as a signatory
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of the UN Charter, and with most of its members as participants in the CDA and the Nuremberg
Tribunals, committed a crime against peace under these laws.
The UN Charter states in Article Two, Paragraph Four that states may not intervene in
one another’s affairs by any means “in any manner inconsistent with the [p]urposes of the United
Nations.”200 At first glance, this appears to be another obligation that NATO breached in 1999,
but actually, it is where the Kosovo case differs drastically from those of Vietnam or Nicaragua.
201
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often coincide.”202 Though Anderson argues against NATO’s use of force in Kosovo, describing
it as a serious violation of international law, the law had not yet caught up to a humanitarian
system of ethics. In order to comply with the spirit of international law described in the UN
Charter, NATO had to break that law. The UN Charter professes again and again the
organization’s desire and intention to protect the innocent from state-sanctioned violence
alongside the Geneva Conventions’ mission. By 1998, it was clear that Kosovar Albanians
would not have success against Milosevic using peaceful means, and that the KLA would never
have the manpower or weapons supplies to end the ethnic cleansing campaigns and deportations.
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its lack of precaution for civilian casualties), Operation Allied Force did bring a war criminal’s
reign of terror to an end. By June of 1999, NATO’s threats of deploying ground forces as well
as the bombing campaign finally forced Milosevic to peace talks.204 The war ended with the
Kumanov Agreement. There are still lingering questions over whether or not this agreement was
legal and therefore binding, since the agreement was reached under threat of force at NATO’s
hand; Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declares a treaty void if it is
reached via coercion.205 Nonetheless, the treaty was honored, and Milosevic and many members
of his government were tried by the ICTY.
After the War
The United States government never articulated a clear legal justification condoning its
NATO actions, instead relying upon an amorphous listing of factors that together
justified the intervention as a matter of policy,
writes Harold Koh, critical of the decisions the Clinton Administration made during the Balkan
wars.206 Koh is fundamentally correct; whenever asked to defend American violations of
international law during the conflict, Clinton and Albright would dive into a conversation about
the United States’ responsibility to intervene in humanitarian conflicts.207
In an interview with CNN, Clinton said that “if the world community has the power to
stop it, we ought to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing.”208 Clinton went on to argue that the
United States was obligated to intervene if there was a moral imperative, like stopping genocide
or ethnic cleansing, if the physical territory was of strategic import to the United States, and if
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the intervention would have low American casualties.209 Though this broad argument, which
CNN nicknamed “the Clinton Doctrine,” is quite difficult to put into practice, it points to a
growing trend in international legal theory.
After Nuremberg established the modern conception of the crime of aggression, the Cold
War enflamed the anxieties of the American people; all-out war seemed a daily threat. Scholar
Linda S. Bishai writes,
[t]he American legal profession turned to the… consent-based approach… and developed
a concept of the international lawyer as policymaker, in which a whole range of policy
options [including an all-out war] could be justified as necessary,
and as self defense or third party defense.210 This meant that outlawing wars of aggression did
not stop states from engaging in interstate violence, but rather, made those states justify the war
in a different manner. Rather than arguing that a war is a just war between equal foes, as was
ideal before the CDA, after Nuremberg, states justified their military actions by depicting wars as
“wars of necessity, or self defense, policing action” or third party defense.211 The change is
significant, and reflects Secretary Albright’s view of the Kosovo conflict as
ground zero in the debate over whether America should play a new role in the world, that
of the indispensable nation asserting its morality as well as its interests to assure stability,
stop thugs, and prevent human atrocities.212
That the United States did not need to make a legal justification for its involvement in
Kosovo demonstrates the truth of Joseph Margulies’ declaration that “power implies the license
to make and justify the rules.”213 This is sobering. NATO members were not sanctioned or tried
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for their actions in Kosovo, but instead, the UNSC passed Resolution 1244, authorizing a foreign
civil and military presence in the region, while UN General Assembly President Kofi Annan
praised NATO’s actions.214
Moreover, the UN made three mistakes that would impact the future of international law
by not sanctioning NATO. First, the UN demonstrated to the world that there was no force on
earth that could force wealthy Western nations, especially the United States, to do anything.
Imposing economic sanctions on the United States, let alone every member of NATO, would
cripple the world, and would likely be logistically impossible anyway, but demonstrating this
truth so forcefully by not even trying to condemn NATO’s illegal actions was a stark reminder of
where power actually lay in the world.215 Secondly, when the UN did not sanction NATO for
committing crimes it had punished other states for committing, the UN showed that “its rules are
enforced only selectively and only in accordance with the preferences of great powers.”216 The
UN set an obvious double standard in its legal code that inherently weakened that code. Were
some countries responsible under international criminal law while others were not? Were the
laws NATO broke simply not going to be enforced anymore? One can easily see the confusion
and immorality in this situation. Finally, the United Nations opened the door to future collective
breaches of international criminal law. When it did not punish or condemn NATO for its
breaches of law, the UN tacitly accepted that a “group of state can unilaterally decide to
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intervene.”217 This principle alone could have grave impacts on the state of international criminal
law. For example, should several states band together to exterminate an unpopular ethnic
minority, and those states would be logistically difficult to punish, what action could the UN
take, following the precedent it set after Operation Allied Force? The implications are, indeed,
sobering. The aftermath of the conflict in Kosovo demonstrates that the US is of grave
importance to the ability of the global community to respond to state-sanctioned violence and
atrocity crimes, both as a predominant military power, but also as a state signatory of modern
international criminal law.218

Conclusion: The Aftermath of American Atrocity Crimes
The International Criminal Court: An Epilogue
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Though President Clinton repeatedly spoke of his hope for a permanent war crimes
tribunal like the ones in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, he ultimately opposed the creation of the
International Criminal Court. As a result, the United States is not a member of the ICC, a
position that substantially weakens both the US’ ability to claim it acts in the interests of the
global community and the ICC’s ability to properly enforce the Rome Statute, which mirrors the
Geneva Conventions in its definitions of war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against
humanity. America’s consistent refusal to join the ICC stems from the fear the the ICC would
prosecute Americans.
However, until it became clear that the Rome Statute would include the crime of
aggression, the United States was a dedicated leader while the document was drafted. The United
States vehemently argued against including the crime. One observer noted that
it was evident that the reluctance to give ambitious new crimes courts jurisdiction over
the central crime of war-making derived from the [United S]tates’ ambivalent legacy
after Nuremberg.219
At Nuremberg, the United States had insisted on prosecuting Nazi leaders for bringing such a
war to Europe, and on demonstrating Nuremberg was not “victor’s justice,” but rather, a standard
for all nations.220 However, as noted in the quotation above, American actions contradicted the
ideology that dominated Nuremberg. The United States had reason to fear prosecution within the
new ICC, as demonstrated by the previous chapters.
Instead of joining the ICC and acknowledging its war crimes, the United States adopted
the American Service-Member’s Protection Act. The Act prohibits American cooperation with
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the Court, and “authorizes the use of all means necessary to secure the release of Americans held
by or for the ICC.”221 Not only does the American government oppose the ICC, but it
deliberately fights against its jurisdiction, attempting to undermine it.222 Many regard the Court
as a failure given its inefficiency and perhaps disproportional focus on African criminals, but it is
possible that with American support, the Court could have been what it was intended to be: an
enforcement mechanism for international criminal law.
The United States has also made little progress in regulating the domestic prosecution of
American service-members. In 1996, Congress passed the War Crimes Act, which adopted the
grave breaches defined by the Geneva Conventions into domestic law and created a system
through which the Department of Justice could try a service-member.223 Unfortunately, no
American service-member has ever been tried under the WCA.224 The political repercussions of
trying someone under the law would be vast, especially because doing so would be effectively
admitting that the American military violated international law.225 Though obviously ethically
preferable to continuing to ignore the war crimes of the 20th century, trials of this nature are
extremely unlikely to take place.
Final Notes
This thesis has demonstrated that the United States has indubitably committed grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions by using military intervention to protect American interests,
by either directly committing or allowing the commission of crimes against civilians, and by
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failing to hold those perpetrators responsible. Nonetheless, there exists no force, military or
economic, that could coerce the United States into submitting its service-members to
international courts or tribunals. Thus, the responsibility to enforce the legal standards held
sacred by the Geneva Conventions, the UN Charter, and the United States’ own professed
ideology lies solely with the United States itself. America is one of the few nations on earth
capable of offering a fair and full trial to those who commit the most heinous of crimes. Thus far,
it has refused to do so when its own leaders have violated the laws of war in Vietnam, and
Nicaragua, and this refusal has changed the enforceability and the nature of the international
criminal law that so many fought to codify.
Chapter Three quoted Secretary Madeleine Albright when she said that “just because you
can’t act everywhere doesn’t mean you don’t act anywhere.226 Albright was defending America’s
involvement in Kosovo at the time, encouraging the United States to protect the rights of ethnic
and religious minorities all over the world. However, this concept of acting where one is able can
also be applied to the future of American war crimes law in holding individuals accountable for
their past crimes; just because one cannot prosecute every war criminal does not mean one
should not prosecute any.
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